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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
REFUGEE AND IDP RETURN TO AND WITHIN SOUTH SUDAN \ HEIDRUN BOHNET
This Working Paper1 investigates the challenges South Sudanese returnees and 
displaced persons face from their very own perspective. Building on field  
research in the autumn and winter of 2015 , it analyses the patterns of return 
and coping strategies of returnees, as well as any assistance that aid agencies 
can provide. The findings indicate that return is neither a simple, linear nor 
necessarily durable solution. From the viewpoint of the returnees, the main 
challenges of return are the lack of physical security, food, water, education 
and jobs. As resources in South Sudan are very scarce overall because of a col-
lapsing economy and continued fighting, competition over resources between 
returnees and local communities, as well among returnees, is common. The 
easy access to small arms, ethnic divisions and mistrust between groups further 
exacerbate these tensions. The sustainability of return seems to depend largely 
on how well returnees can access resources at their return location and thus 
secure a livelihood for them and their families, which, in turn, is not only  
influenced by the social network and political access the returnees have but 
also the economic situation at the return location. Aid agencies therefore 
should support livelihood opportunities and early development programmes 
at the preferred return locations, including local communities and youth 
groups in their efforts, to reduce feelings of inequality between groups. Besides 
diversified and long-term economic development initiatives, higher education 
opportunities as well as psychological support must also be provided to guar-
antee self-sufficiency of returnees and prevent renewed displacement.  
1 \  The author would like to thank all persons and organizations that assisted her in her field research and provided valuable feedback to this Working 
Paper. Particular thanks go to the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils (DRC and NRC), Laura Gerken and Elke Grawert (BICC).
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necessarily indicate that the returnees have been sus-
tainably reintegrated so that they are not forced to 
flee again. In South Sudan, often the host community 
is impoverished, with no livelihood opportunities. 
While it is true that returnees might be more vulner-
able as, for example, they have lost their land, they 
may be even better off than members of the host 
community because of their higher education oppor-
tunities in exile that possibly equip them with need-
ed skills at the return location. While the situation of 
the two might not be identical, they can influence 
each other; creating competition between the two 
over often scarce resources, such as food, land and 
jobs. 
Accessibility of resources crucial for 
sustainable return
Field research findings in the autumn and winter 
of 2015 indicate that besides individual characteris-
tics and experience during displacement, the sustain-
ability of return of an individual depends largely on 
the accessibility of resources and livelihood oppor-
tunities at his or her return location. These include 
mainly, but are not limited to, the access to food, land, 
jobs, markets and education. These different econ-
omic factors are interlinked; access to land or a job 
can influence the food security of the returnee. The 
access to these resources is very much dependent on 
the social network and political access the returnee 
has and aid services received at the return location.
Return is not necessarily a signal for 
peace
The voluntary return of displaced persons does 
not automatically start with the signing of a peace 
agreement. Some have already returned before that 
and others may still not return as fighting is still on-
going or they do not trust the peace process. Return, 
therefore, has no clear beginning or end. Yet, aid 
agencies in South Sudan are often still structured 
along conflict and “post-conflict” scenarios even 
though this does not reflect the reality on the ground. 
Spontaneous or early returnees in particular fall 
through the grid of the current aid structure that is 
focused mainly on emergency and that does not in-
clude relief work. 
Return is a dynamic process and shows 
different patterns
Patterns of return in South Sudan are diverse and 
dynamic. Individual characteristics of the returnee, 
such as ethnicity, gender and age, influence the re-
turn location and its economic, social and political 
context. Particular return patterns are, moreover, 
used as coping strategies of returnees, such as split-
ting up family members and moving back and forth 
between displacement and return locations, as well 
as moving to locations where the returnee is part of 
an ethnic majority and, thus, can rely on ethnic kin-
ship assistance. Furthermore, as return can encom-
pass moving to a new location, it can be linked to lo-
cal integration. While the majority still seems to 
return to rural settings, a trend towards the urbaniza-
tion of returnees can be observed. 
Local communities are nearly as  
vulnerable as returnees are
Some aid organizations and scholars assume that 
returnees are reintegrated and that return has been 
sustainable when their situation is similar to that of 
the local communities that receive them. Yet field re-
search observations made in South Sudan demon-
strate that similar situations of the two do not 
Main findings
REFUGEE AND IDP RETURN TO AND WITHIN SOUTH SUDAN \ HEIDRUN BOHNET
6 \ \ WORKING PAPER 7  \ 2016
help implement programmes more effectively. To 
build up livelihoods, the land and seeds provided 
must be of a good quality, with land, for instance being 
close to water boreholes. 
Target young people
Local livelihood programmes should, in addition, 
target young people and provide them with future 
perspectives other than violence. Young men between 
18 and 35 in particular are often neglected as they are 
not considered “vulnerable”. Yet, they can be a highly 
influential force “when it comes to the peace process 
or disrupting it—if overlooked” (Bohnet, 2016b, p. 3). 
Including young people also means access to higher 
education opportunities and adequate vocational 
training that, to assure quality, ought to extend  
beyond a few days. Salaries of teachers need to be paid, 
and training of teachers promoted so that quality of 
teaching is also guaranteed. 
Be pro-active and start early  
development programmes
Overall, aid and local government agencies 
should strive to act pro-actively so that early and 
spontaneous returnees are not neglected. People have 
already returned and thus, aid agencies should act 
fast not to delay assistance so that these returnees 
are not forced to migrate again. Despite the fact that 
only recently, people have fled and become displaced 
again, it has also to be acknowledged that some dis-
placed persons will return early despite the unstable 
situation. The focus of aid agencies should not only 
be on emergency, but also on development to address 
the full cycle from displacement to reintegration. It 
has been observed that South Sudan does not follow 
“clear stages” (Schomerus & Allen, 2010, p. 11) of con-
flict and peace, meaning that there are no clear-cut 
endings and beginnings between conflict and peace. 
As not all people can or want to return to their 
pre-crisis or ancestral home, local integration mea-
sures have to be fostered. Receiving information 
about the situation at the pre-crisis home can also 
help the displaced person to make more informed 
Based on the above findings from field research in 
South Sudan and Ethiopia in the autumn and winter 
of 2015 as well as secondary literature, the author  
recommends that local and international aid organiza-
tions working in South Sudan
Include the host community in the 
(re)-integration process of returnees
First, the host community is not necessarily better 
off than the returnees and, thus, should be included 
in aid provisions and local livelihood activities.  
Otherwise, it is likely that a feeling of inequality  
develops and increases tensions between the two 
groups. Second, including the host community can 
help identify necessary gaps in the local markets, in 
resources and skills needed so that trainings and pro-
grammes can be adapted and applied accordingly, 
avoiding any waste of funds. As a clear differentiation 
between returnees and hosts is often difficult, such 
as in Bor, and as the needs of the two groups are often 
not that different, it would be advisable not to differ-
entiate between groups, but to support the whole 
community instead. Greater flexibility in donors  
assistance and programmes would therefore be 
desirable.
Promote livelihood opportunities and 
guarantee quality and diversification
As sustainable return and reintegration seems to 
largely depend on the livelihood opportunities at the 
return location, aid agencies should attempt to make 
sure that resources are accessible. This includes long-
term approaches, resulting in multi-year commit-
ments (OCHA et al., 2016) until returnees have be-
come self-sufficient. Aid agencies must finally learn 
from the past that neglecting locations, such as Aweil, 
through short-term approaches can lead to new “cri-
sis” spots. Moreover, offering diversified income op-
portunities (rural and urban) will make the returnees 
more resistant to “shocks” and has proven to help re-
turnees overcome livelihood gaps. Furthermore, 
bringing in and consulting with the local govern-
ment makes them assume responsibility, which can 
Recommendations
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decisions about their return and, therefore, informa-
tion-sharing should be supported. By not having false 
expectations once the returnees return, grievance 
and frustration levels will be lower and thus, also the 
likelihood of resorting to violence. 
Take the psychological dimension of  
reintegration into account
While the emphasis of sustainable return has 
been on the ability to establish livelihood opportuni-
ties, the psychological dimension of reintegration 
that relates to one’s identity, the feeling of home and 
one’s psychological well-being (Ruben et al., 2009,  
p. 910) should not be neglected. It has been men-
tioned less here and possibly in previous studies  
before because it is a component that is hard to mea-
sure. Yet, non-government organizations (NGOs) have 
repeatedly suggested that reconciliation is not possible 
before trauma-healing and accounting for the past 
has been addressed. The author’s research, in Aweil, 
Bor and Juba, has shown that people did not want to 
return because they did not trust the peace process, 
and because of the traumatic experiences they had 
faced. The South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), a 
council of various churches in South Sudan, has been 
a good example in promoting trauma-awareness and 
in reconciliation activities among different ethnic 
communities. Although stakeholders could not agree 
on when reconciliation can and should happen and 
how it is best achieved, many expressed the need for 
trauma-healing as a precondition for sustainable re-
integration. Yet, psychiatric care is very limited  
(Amnesty International, 2016, p. 8).
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Five years after independence and one year after 
the signing of the peace deal in August 2015, South 
Sudan is back in turmoil. Despite the peace agreement, 
fighting had never really stopped, but the recent  
violence in Juba and Wau in July of 2016 had been 
particular large in scale, and the slight hope that the 
slow peace process would advance, has been shattered. 
Instead, the country is facing civil war again.
But even before these recent violent events, most 
aid organizations1 and displaced persons, as well as 
many other stakeholders had been sceptical about 
the peace process in South Sudan. The constellation 
of power had remained the same, with Salva Kiir as 
president and Riek Machar as vice-president—despite 
the fact that both had been accused of having com-
mitted war crimes.2 The recent replacement of Machar 
by Taban Deng Gai, former chief negotiator for South 
Sudan’s armed opposition, as vice-president (Sudan 
Tribune, 27-07-2016) will most likely not contribute to 
the stability of the country either. This is confirmed 
by the statement made by Machar on 25 September in 
which he declares “war” on the “regime” and con-
demns the appointment of Taban Deng Gai (Sudan 
Tribune, 25-09-2016). It rather demonstrates the divi-
sions within the armed opposition faction of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army-in- Opposition (SPLA-IO). 
Mistrust within and among different groups prevails 
and is widespread but the divisions are much more 
complex than “only” between the two major ethnic 
groups—Dinka (Salva Kiir is from the Dinka commu-
nity) versus Nuer (Riek Machar is from the Nuer com-
munity). It is not even known who started the latest 
violence in Juba. Different groups accuse each other. 
In addition, the economy is collapsing (Golla, 2016) 
and the level of food insecurity has reached its highest 
level since the start of the conflict in December 2013 
(Sudan Tribune, 30-06-2016). Although South Sudan is 
potentially a rich country with its oil reserves and  
arable land, it is at the brink of national bankruptcy 
(Grieß, 2016). 
In spite of this precarious situation, people have 
stayed, and some have returned even before the signing 
1 \  The author refers to all international, national and local actors invol-
ved in aid services, be they humanitarian or development. See, also 
Collinson and Duffield (2013, p.1).
2 \  See African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 2014.
of the peace deal. Yet the majority of people remain 
displaced. Although precise numbers are hard to get,3 
UNHCR (2015) assumes that in 2014 around 200,000 
people returned and many thousands followed before 
the outbreak of the recent violence that has displaced 
thousands again.4    
According to UNHCR,return is one of the three 
durable solutions besides local integration and resettle-
ment to a third country. Furthermore, return is often 
considered a “signifier for peace” (Kälin, 2008, p. 2). Yet 
the case of South Sudan clearly demonstrates that  
return is not always durable and not necessarily  
directly linked to peace. To be durable, it also needs to 
be successful and sustainable (Black & Gent, 2004). 
More than twenty years ago, researchers studying 
refugees pointed out that return is not a “problem-free” 
process (Rogge, 1994, p. 14). It neither automatically 
means peace (Adelman, 2002; Macrae, 1999), nor is it 
enough to promote it (Black & Gent, 2004, p. 12). Instead, 
it can lead to security risks (Lischer, 2011). The question 
of how return can be made sustainable is badly under-
studied. Furthermore, no common agreement exists 
among social scientists on what sustainable return is 
actually about or how it can be measured (Gent & 
Black, 2005, p.1). The most common definition is that 
returnees are not forced to migrate again (Black & 
Gent, 2004, p. 15). This definition will also be used here 
for comparison reasons although the author acknowl-
edges that returnees might still be mobile. Yet, the 
answer to how to guarantee that returnees do not 
have to flee again, in other words, how to make their 
return sustainable, is a matter of discussion between 
policymakers and aid organizations. 
If return is not made sustainable, conflict can re-
emerge, for example, between returnees and the local 
host community, and people might be forced to flee 
again (Black & Gent, 2004, p. 9), as currently seen in 
South Sudan. Then return does not only affect the in-
dividual but can have further consequences for the 
wider community where the displaced persons return 
to. Returnees also take the sustainability of return 
into consideration when assessing whether to return 
3 \  Returnees do not necessarily register themselves or are registered.  
Moreover, the distinction between returnee and displaced persons is 
not always clear-cut as is outlined later in the text.
4 \  UNMISS speaks of 7,000 (Sudan Tribune, 07-11-2016) while OCHA 
(2016a) estimates up to 36,000.
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forward in regard to the recent returns since December 
2013. This Paper takes previous and current return 
movements into account, compares them and draws 
lessons from them. Although the focus is on return, 
the author clearly states that she does not wish to  
favour involuntary return but rather intents to make 
donors and aid organizations alike aware of the chal-
lenges to return and stay. Uniquely, she describes these 
challenges from the perspective of displaced persons 
and previous returnees themselves as their views un-
til now have largely been ignored in the study of sus-
tainable return (Bohnet, Mielke, Rudolf, Schetter, & 
Vollmer, 2015). While the term ‘sustainability’ has 
mainly been used in development debates and was 
originally coined in studies relating to ecology, it has 
also been put in relation to an array of terms (Baker, 
2006, p. 7), amongst them return (see, for example: 
Black & Gent, 2004). Yet, what it encompasses is debated. 
This Paper tries to provide some insights in the issue 
of sustainable return in the context of South Sudan 
and how it could be supported by aid agencies, know-
ing well that sustainability is dynamic and not about 
reaching an end state (Baker, 2006, p.7). 
The Paper starts with an introduction to the 
methodology used and then gives a short overview of 
the context of displacement and return dynamics in 
South Sudan. It follows with a description of the ob-
servations made during the field research, including 
interview extracts and views of displaced persons and 
local communities.  The author then analyses the find-
ings, depicting patterns and components of sustaina-
ble return to and within South Sudan, as well as the 
livelihood situation of returnees and the challenges 
of sustainable return. The results show that sustaina-
bility of return largely depends on the access of re-
sources at the return location. These are dependent on 
the skill levels of the returnees and aid services deliv-
ered to them, but also on the returnee’s social networks, 
family and ethnic ties and political inclusion levels. 
Return is not just a technical issue where aid can “fix” 
everything, but rather a very “highly politically charged 
process” (Gent & Black, 2005, p.1). Therefore, all involved 
need to bear in mind that understanding the challenges 
of return might be helpful for aid organizations and 
policymakers alike.
or not (Black & Gent, 2004, p. 18). Thus, to understand 
the assistance returnees need to make their return 
last is crucial.
Based on a two-and-a-half month field research 
in South Sudan and Ethiopia in the autumn/ winter 
of 2015, this Paper investigates the challenges and coping 
strategies of South Sudanese returnees and the assis-
tance needed by aid agencies. Return became a sensi-
tive issue shortly after the signing of the peace deal 
in 2015 as aid organizations interviewed feared that if 
one talked about return, donors would assume that 
there are no more emergencies. In view of the recent 
outbreak of violence, return of displaced persons seems 
currently also not viable (Sudan Tribune, 04-06-2016). 
Still, people have returned before and others will return 
again despite the grim situation. As the case of South 
Sudan shows, neither conflicts nor displacements 
have clear cut beginnings or ends. The aid structure 
therefore has to be adapted to this fact rather than fol-
lowing a linear structure. This Paper thus argues that 
besides providing emergency relief, aid agencies 
have to develop pro-active development initiatives to 
make the return of displaced persons sustainable, 
particular in conflict settings such as in South Sudan. 
Although Collinson & Duffield (2013) had already 
pointed out the specificities and challenges of aid in 
conflict settings, they did not explicitly address the 
issue of return. Even despite more extensive research 
on return in the last decades (Bakewell, 1999; Black & 
Koser, 1999; Long, 2013), studies have mostly been  
restricted to legal aspects (Bradley, 2013) or centred 
around the conditions for the decision to and the 
process of return (Hammond, 2014). Those that have 
focused more on the question of sustainable return 
have been limited to the European context and to ref-
ugees exclusively (see, for example: Black, 2002). This 
Paper goes beyond the return of refugees by including 
the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). As 
IDPs often represent the largest bulk of displaced per-
sons, it is essential not to ignore them in the return 
process. As the IDP settlements in South Sudan are 
not considered to be a sustainable solution (Arensen, 
2016), the question is how their return can be made 
sustainable and how a durable solution can be found.
While much research has been done on previous 
return movements to South Sudan, less has been put 
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conflict in December 2013, the other two field 
locations, Bor and Juba present more recent cases of 
return as they have been at the centre of the conflict 
(African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 
2014). Until the autumn of 2015 return to both these 
places was mainly spontaneous. In addition, although 
exact numbers are hard to get, there seemed to be 
large numbers of returnees in Bor and Juba at the 
time of the field research. The cities were amongst 
the first return locations. The situation has changed 
again as those who had settled there have been dis-
placed again. Yet lessons might be learned from the 
previous return processes for better preparation of  
future return waves.
To investigate the challenges of return displaced 
South Sudanese and returnees are facing, the author 
conducted a small N-study (i.e. a study of a few cases), 
a two-month field research at three different loca-
tions: Aweil, Bor and Juba (see following map) within 
South Sudan from early October to the end of November 
2015. These three locations are the main cities in each 
of the states and were chosen because they represent 
different waves of return.5   
Aweil saw one of the largest waves of organized 
and spontaneous returnees from Northern Sudan after 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005  
and after the independence of South Sudan in 2011.  It 
therefore represents an older case of return. While  
Aweil has until recently been quite unaffected by the 
 
5 \  The sites were chosen in close cooperation with local and international 
experts.
Methodology
Map 1  
Research sites in South Sudan and Ethiopia
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Besides displaced persons, returnees and hosts of 
various gender and age groups within South Sudan, 
the author also interviewed South Sudanese refugees 
from the Nuer ethnic group9 who lived in the camps 
Jewii and Tierkidi, near Gambella town in Ethiopia. 
The author asked them about the challenges they are 
facing in their return to South Sudan. Through this 
data, she was able to compare return dynamics and 
challenges of return among refugees and IDPs. 
The author faced multiple challenges during the 
interviews: Security, accessibility and mistrust were 
the main ones. Due to security risks, the author could 
not cover all areas and was accompanied sometimes 
by a local guide or government official. Therefore, she 
was not able to randomly select locations or interview 
partners. People were not always able to talk freely 
even though the author tried to find places where 
they were most at ease and could speak privately.  
Despite the fact that the author made clear from the 
beginning that the interviews were voluntary, confi-
dential and that they would not necessarily change 
their situation to prevent false expectations,10 some 
people were reluctant to talk without being paid any 
money or receiving aid assistance. The gender issue, 
too, caused uncertainty whether men would have  
responded differently if they had talked to a man.
All the interviews were then triangulated by com-
bining various perspectives. On-the-spot observations 
were crucial to understanding the local circumstances. 
These were, furthermore, framed by various expert 
interviews with local and international NGOs and  
international organizations as well as local government 
officials.11 Finally, secondary literature on return, rein-
tegration as well as on displacement and South Sudan 
was included and compared to the findings of the 
field research to see if they coincide and support each 
other or contradictions arise. 
To draw conclusions from the literature and the 
additional data collected on the situation of returnees 
in South Sudan, the data (interviews and observations) 
were analysed with the impoverishment and risk 
model by Cernea (2000). While his model has been  
9 \  Refugees in Gambella are mainly of the Nuer ethnicity.
10 \  See also Mazurana, Jacobsen, & Gale (2013) for more details on chal-
lenges of conducting research in conflict settings.
11 \  In total, 40 experts were interviewed.
The author conducted individual semi-structured 
in-depth narrative interviews6 as well as focus group 
discussions,7 thus taking a qualitative approach to 
understand the “stories” behind the returns better. 
The interview partners were chosen through snowball 
sampling. Despite the fact that a representative sample 
could not be drawn because of security and feasibility 
reasons, the author tried to include different gender 
and age, as well as ethnic groups because returnees, 
like displaced persons, are not homogenous.8 In addi-
tion, to have various perspectives and to verify state-
ments, the author chose people from different walks 
of life: From students, to the community over church 
leaders and local government representatives. The  
author tried to reduce bias (see Jacobsen & Landau, 
2003, p. 13) by starting the snowball sample from vari-
ous angles, interviewing returnees as well as members 
of the host community to compare their situation to 
that of the returnees. They were both asked about 
their relationship with each other, as well as about 
their security, food and work situation. This helped 
identify the relation between the two groups and 
their effects on each other on the question of sustain-
able return. With the focus of the Paper,consequently, 
lying on the micro level as it analyses the situation of 
individual returnees and hosts, some part of it was on 
the meso/group-level, investigating the relation  
between the returnees and hosts.
While the author focused her attention during 
her field research on civilian returnees and not on 
former combatants, she experienced that the line  
between civilians and combatants cannot always be 
clearly drawn as many civilians are armed, and com-
batants often live with their families (Breitung, Paes, 
& van de Vondervoort, 2016, p.19) as some returnees in-
terviewed stated that they had fought before. 
6 \  Seven in Juba, eight in Aweil and seven in Bor. For most interviews, 
the author worked with a translator of the same gender and ethnicity 
as the interview partners
7 \  Two focus groups in Aweil with women and seven men and two focus 
groups in Juba with three men (students) and five men (leaders). In 
the focus group discussions and interviews with women, the author 
was supported by a female translator..
8 \  In Aweil, the author interviewed Dinka and Luo ethnic groups. In Bor, 
she interviewed Dinka from Bor, Twic East and Duk as well as Nuer. In 
Juba, she questioned both Dinka and Nuer as well as people from the 
Madi ethnic group.
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developed for resettlement, it can also be applied to 
the reintegration of displaced persons and has also 
been used previously in this context (see, for example, 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2010; 
Lukunka, 2013).
Cernea (2000) delineates eight risk factors that 
come with displacement and suggests ways of ad-
dressing them. He stresses social and economic com-
ponents of reintegration, such as access to land, a job, 
shelter, social inclusion, food and health security, res-
toration of property, as well as rebuilding of social 
networks. Therefore, particularly these aspects also 
will be focused upon in the analysis of challenges of 
sustainable return. Yet while Cernea’s (2000) model 
can be helpful to measure the reintegration level of 
South Sudanese returnees and indicate main risk  
factors of impoverishment, it implies linearity. He  
assumes that there has been a loss of one of the com-
ponents, such as jobs or shelter and that during  
displacement or after, this component is restored. Yet, 
some displaced persons can be better off during dis-
placement instead of after displacement. Therefore to 
compare the situation of returnees to before, during 
and after displacement and analysing the situation 
of an individual over time does not necessarily imply 
that the situation progressively gets better—it rather 
shows that it might have “ups and downs”. The fact 
that a returnee finds him/herself in the same situation 
as before or during displacement does not necessarily 
mean that he is well off.  Consequently, the Paper focuses 
especially on the livelihood situation of displaced 
persons once they returned.
Table 1  
Numbers of displaced persons in protection of civilan sites 
(PoCs) in South Sudan
PoCs Jan. 2016* 27 June 2016** 4 July 2016***
Wau 202 219 219
Bentiu 115,014 97,221 93,817
Melut 664 700 700
Malakal 47,020 32,719 32,719
Bor 2,283 2,004 2,004
Juba 27,983 27,959 27,959
TOTAL 193,166 160,822 169,418 
Sources: *Arensen, 2016; **United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 2016b;   
            ***United Nations Mission in South Sudan. 2016a
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The topic of return is not new for policymakers, 
aid organizations and researchers in South Sudan, as 
the country has long and previous experience of con-
flict and return. “Most South Sudanese have lived 
through a multiplicity of episodes of war and attempts 
at peace building” (Pendle, 2016). Yet questions about 
how sustainable return can be promoted remain. In 
addition, recommendations of the past have often 
still not been put into practice because of technical 
difficulties, donor structures and a lack of political 
will. Moreover, there has been no recent move toward 
demobilization (International Crisis Group, 2016), and 
previous demobilization processes have been slow or 
have failed altogether (Turyamureeba, 2014). 
The last major return wave had occurred after the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) on 9 January 2005, which had ended the forty- 
year long civil war between the North and South of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sudan that had erupted because of “economic mar-
ginalization of the South and a near-exclusion of 
southerners from positions in the government” 
(Grawert, 2010, p. 1). The war had displaced more than 
four million people. Between 2007 and 2013, around 
two million people had returned. The returnees had 
been full of hope (United Nations Mission in Sudan, 
2016). Yet their return was not sustainable as in  
December 2013 new conflict erupted, and people had 
to flee again. 
What had started as a political power struggle  
between President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Riek 
Machar in December 2013 (Johnson, 2014), quickly 
took on an ethnical dimension as the two leaders  
represent two different ethnic groups that had long 
been rivals. This conflict, which was only one of 
many,12 but one with the largest scale of fatalities, 
displaced more than 2.3 million people (Golla, 2016). 
.
12 \  For the different types of conflicts in South Sudan, see Box 1.
Displacement and return in the 
context of South Sudan
Map 2  
Numbers of displaced persons in South Sudan by state
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While a peace accord was signed between Kiir 
and Machar in August 2015, the large majority of dis-
placed persons has not yet returned. Around 1,7 million 
people remain internally displaced, and over 600,000 
displaced in the neighbouring countries: Ethiopia, Su-
dan, Kenya and Uganda (Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016b). The renewed large-
scale violence in Juba has furthermore displaced re-
turnees and hosts. 
Persons who have been displaced within South 
Sudan live in any of the seven protection of civilian 
sites (PoCs) as the internally displaced (IDP) camps 
in South Sudan are called or in spontaneous settle-
ments throughout the country. Two PoCs are located 
in Juba and the others in Wau, Bor, Bentiu, Melut and 
Malakal. The majority of IDPs, however, live outside 
the PoCs. The Protection Cluster South Sudan (2016) 
estimates that 1.69 million people were displaced out-
side of the PoCs in contrast to 188,184 within PoCs by 
31 March 2016. The majority of South Sudanese refu-
gees can be found in Gambella, Ethiopia 
Despite the Peace Agreement, fighting between 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and  
SPLA-IO (in opposition) had continued, albeit on a 
smaller scale until July 2016, namely in Western Bahr 
el Ghazal and Unity (Protection Cluster South Sudan, 
2016, p. 2). In addition, inter-communal fighting, such 
as in Jonglei, has also caused displacement, although 
the situation since 2014 has been “slowly recovering” 
(Johnson, Thomas, Mozersky, & Marekia, 2016, p.13). 
In January 2014, Bor was still a “ghost town” as every-
one had fled the city, but since March 2014, people 
have started to return. Before the renewed violence in 
July 2016 IDPs also left spontaneously from the PoCs 
in Bentiu, Bor and Juba to where the security situa-
tion had recently improved (Protection Cluster South 
Sudan, 2016, p. 2). As can be seen in Table 1, from Janu-
ary to July 2016 the numbers of displaced persons in 
some of the PoCs fell. Returns from Juba to Upper 
Nile, organized by the government, have also taken 
place. Yet, the very recent violence makes return of 
displaced persons a challenging endeavour and 
seems far from a durable solution. Yet, what are and 
have been the challenges to return, particularly from 
the perspectives of the displaced and returnees 
themselves?
Box 1  
South Sudan’s many conflicts
It is neigh on impossible to provide an overview of all conflicting par-
ties and conflicts here; yet this Box attempts to provide a short over-
view of some of the main players mentioned in the context of the field 
research. It is too simplistic to describe the conflict dynamics since 
December 2013 in binary terms, such as Kiir versus Machar or Dinka 
versus Nuer. The reality “… is [instead] a complicated web of competing 
interests and alliances that shift according to the perceived interests of 
those involved” (Johnson et al., 2016, p.4) and include many more lay-
ers and fractions, even inside the SPLA-IO (Young, 2015). They cannot 
always be clearly separated, but are rather interlinked respectively built 
on one another and involve often different types of (ethnic and demo-
graphic) groups, as well as different locations within South Sudan:
Shilluk, Dinka and Nuer tensions are predominately prevalent near 
Malakal in Upper Nile state, the “oil producing border area” (Schomer-
us & Allen, 2010, p. 17). The decree of October 2015 by Salva Kiir to di-
vide South Sudan’s ten states into 28 has led to particular resentment 
among the Shilluk against the Dinka (Human Security Baseline As-
sessment, 2016, p. 1) as the decree will split their “kingdom” and in all 
likelihood reduce their power status in the area. 
Murle of Pibor county in Jonglei state have a “history of hostile rela-
tions with Dinka, Lou Nuer and Anuak” (Johnson, 2014, p. 305). Be-
sides the Dinka and Nuer, the Murle are the most politically, economi-
cally and socially marginalized (Leff, 2012, p. 6) in Jonglei, a fact that 
has led to frustration among them and to violence against the other 
two groups. Competition often arises over land and cattle.  
Cattle raids are often carried out by young men (of all ethnicities) 
based at cattle camps. The reasons are diverse, but range from the une-
ven distribution of wealth, inflation of bride-price […] and the prolifer-
ation of arms” (Schomerus & Allen, 2010, p. 9). It has even become a 
“survival strategy” (Schomerus & Allen, 2010, p. 17).
Conflict over access to land has been one of the main “triggers of local 
violence” (Schomerus & Allen, 2010, p. 53). Clashes have been recorded 
between hosts and IDPs, as well as between returnees and hosts and 
different types of ethnic groups as outlined above. Tensions over other 
resources such as water and food have also been recorded. They take 
place on the micro level, but could have repercussions on a wider level.
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    Source: REACH, 2015b (modified figure)
Overall, the author identified four different return 
schemes in reaction to the lack of physical security. 
   \ Displaced who wish to return but do not trust the 
peace process. With the independence of South 
Sudan, returnees at that time had high hopes 
of an improvement and change of the situation, 
but four years later, most of them were disillu-
sioned as they saw that nothing had changed. 
In some cases, the security and economic situ-
ation even got worse. South Sudanese refugees 
at Jewii camp in Ethiopia, for example, reported 
that although they had heard that a peace deal 
was signed in August 2015, they also appre-
hended that fighting is still going on. Displaced 
persons, interviewed in Jewii, Juba and Bor, 
stated that they were thus “confused” and won-
dered why the International Community does 
not put more pressure on the leaders to step 
down. Although they wanted to return, they 
did not trust the fragile peace, particularly  
because they had experienced before that a 
peace agreement alone does not guarantee 
peace. A 30 year old South Sudanese Nuer in 
Jewii camp even stated that he will never go 
back again because of what he had previously 
experienced and because he sees no future 
back in South Sudan. 
 In the interviews, displaced persons in Ethiopia 
and South Sudan, as well as returnees in South Sudan 
and host communities in both countries, mentioned 
six major challenges to return: lack of physical secu-
rity, lack of food and water, difficult or no access to 
land and property, the difficulty of generating an in-
come, insufficient schooling and, finally, marginaliza-
tion. While this priority list of challenges might not 
be the same for all interviewed and not be represent-
ative of all South Sudanese, the interviewees repeat-
edly pointed to these as the main risk factors for their 
return and when they had returned. 
Physical security
The first and major challenge to return for South 
Sudanese refugees interviewed in Gambella internal-
ly displaced (IDPs) in Bor and Juba, has been the lack 
of security13  at their preferred return location. The 
return location could be the pre-crisis or ancestral or 
another new location where they had not lived before. 
Strictly speaking, “return” would not cover the latter, 
but it is the intention of the author to underline here 
that return movements are not necessarily about 
moving “back”, but also about movements to a new 
location. This is why they are included here in the 
analysis of the return process. All interviewees re-
gardless of ethnicity, gender or age group mentioned 
lack of physical security as the main obstacle to 
return.
The return intention survey conducted by the 
REACH Initiative (REACH, 2015a), which took a random 
sample of households in each of the seven PoCs in 
the autumn/winter of 2015 also showed that the lack 
of security was the main reason for not returning, 
thus underlining the author’s findings (see Figure 1). 
The results for the other PoCs are similar. In the 
REACH intention survey, security refers to “the absence 
of fighting”.
13 \  Security here is defined as the physical or human security of the  
individual.
Risks and challenges to sustainable return:  
Voices from the field
Figure 1 
Main reasons why displaced persons in Juba do not return
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   \ Displaced persons in Gambella who wish to return 
when the security situation improves because they 
feel “not at home”, “isolated”, “treated [only] as refu-
gees”, “cannot do things on their own” in Ethiopia. 
Those who had already returned to South Su-
dan also stated that the reason for their return 
was that the host country felt “foreign” to 
them. They rather wanted to live in their “own 
land,” which also meant more “freedom“ for 
them. Some stated that they had returned be-
cause others returned as well. A 19 year old girl 
in Tierkidi camp, for example, indicated that 
she would return when everyone else returns. 
She assumed it would be safe to return then. 
For her, too, security was paramount. Yet an el-
derly man interviewed in Gambella said that 
even if the security situation improved, he 
would not be able to return again because of 
his health.
   \ Displaced who in their perception have made it to the 
half-way point of their return; they have not yet 
reached their preferred return location but 
have already moved away from the host location. 
The returnees originating from Duk and Twic 
East within Bor town explained in November 
2015, for example, that the lack of security pre-
vents them from returning fully back to their 
home county of Duk and Twic East. A 31 year-
old man from Twic East commented that within 
Bor town he felt safe but not outside the town. 
Insecurity prevails. Roads in general in South 
Sudan have not been safe (Logistics Cluster, 
2016) in South Sudan. The Logistics Cluster 
(2016) access constraints map also shows that 
in Jonglei state road warnings are in force, and 
the majority of roads have been closed. One of 
the major fears by the Dinka returnees in Bor 
was that of attacks by the Murle ethnic group 
in Jonglei (see also Box 1 on South Sudan’s 
many conflicts above). Because of a general fear 
of insecurity, many returnees have also settled 
near the “dock site” near the river in Bor so that 
they can quickly cross it again if they need to. 
   \ Displaced who have returned to Juba and Bor conveyed 
that they still felt insecure and were faced with 
threats to their security, such as harassments,  
intimidations, crime, unlawful detention and 
death. Returnees and displaced people felt  
especially insecure because of the widespread 
impunity they witness every day. This worry, 
however, was not only expressed by the returnees 
but also by the host population interviewed.  
A man from the Madi ethnic group in Juba  
explained, for example, about how people in 
his community were robbed and attacked with 
weapons over and over again by the same people. 
He could clearly identify them and they had 
been arrested by the police, yet they were  
released again after only a few days. He believes 
that they were released because of police cor-
ruption. Because of these instances, other  
returnees, such as youth leaders, reported that 
to protect themselves their communities have 
built up their own protection service. 
Thus, displaced persons, returnees and those 
half way there expressed that their main obstacle 
to sustainable return has been the lack of security 
and their lack of trust in the peace process. How-
ever, the different return schemes in regard to  
security also show that feeling safe is an individual 
parameter. For example, two living in the same 
area in Juba of the same ethnic group and gender 
had very different perceptions of the security situ-
ation and their safety. Still, despite different opin-
ions about the security situation, the majority of 
returnees expressed that besides security, food 
and water insecurity were the main challenges for 
them upon their return. 
Water and food
Returnees to Aweil, Bor and Juba experienced water 
and food shortages, which, besides security, was the 
greatest challenge for them. 
In Aweil, for example, a returnee named his “major 
enemy: Hunger”, especially as drought also announced 
itself in that area. Other returnees in Aweil repeated 
that rain was not sufficient and that they coped with 
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supposed to last for two weeks, was not enough to  
alleviate the hunger of the returnees. One elderly 
man explained that he begs other returnees to give 
him additional food. As most aid agencies currently 
still operate in emergency mode, the needs of sponta-
neous returnees in Bor, they feel, have been overlooked.14 
Those interviewed from Duk and Twic East in Bor, 
moreover, stated that they would rather stay in Bor 
for now than return to their home counties as there 
were even less livelihood opportunities than in Bor 
and food was even scarcer. 
According to NGOs and returnees in Bor, as a coping 
strategy, many still go to the food distribution centre 
in the displaced settlement in Mingkaman near Bor 
town where they are still registered and where more 
food is distributed than in Bor for the returnees. The 
situation is that volatile that violent hostilities have 
erupted between them and the host community in 
Mingkaman as the host community not only felt 
they had to compete for resources with them but also 
that they were unequally treated by the aid providers 
in Mingkaman. Yet, returnees were not only in com-
petition with hosts but also with displaced persons. 
As a result, food insecurity of returnees and hosts 
seem to affect the sustainability of return and of 
peace in Bor and Aweil. Returnees and host commu-
nities alike are reliant on food aid and cannot cur-
rently sustain themselves on their own. 
Access to land and property
Ownership of and access to land is another major 
challenge to sustainable return that was mentioned 
and experienced by interviewed displaced persons, 
returnees and hosts. Both can lead to conflicts between 
returnees and hosts and among returnees themselves. 
Tensions evolve around occupied property and the 
 
 
14 \  Food and water insecurity also affected the health of the returnees 
and thus the sustainability of return. Health threats besides malnutri-
tion have been malaria and cholera. MSF notes that malaria cases in 
South Sudan skyrocketed in the autumn of 2015. According to the Uni-
ted Nations Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1.6 million 
malaria cases have been reported (Nguyen, 2016). The distance to the 
nearest doctor or hospital, the financial burden of treatment and the 
lack of medicine at the health facilities themselves were the main 
challenges not only for returnees, but also for hosts.
water and rain shortage. NGOs working in this area 
also confirmed that Aweil had one of the highest mal-
nutrition rates in the country. The Integrated Food 
Security Phase Classification (2016b) pointed out that 
the nutrition situation in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, 
where Aweil is located, has deteriorated dramatically; 
from stressed to crisis classification. Not only returnees 
but also the host population encountered this precar-
ious situation in Aweil, leading to violent tensions  
between them. As someone from the host community 
stated: “We are all fighting hunger”.
When people returned in large numbers in 2011 
after independence, the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) had an additional water borehole 
drilled in Aweil, which reduced conflict between the 
host community and returnees. Yet, two boreholes 
were still not enough to address the water shortage 
in the area. Therefore, several host and returnee 
women recounted regularly erupting fights while 
sourcing water.
Women and men from the host and returnee 
population go to the forest or bush nearby to find 
whatever food is available to survive, but what they 
find does not fulfil their basic needs. Some also collect 
or chop firewood to sell it at the local market to then 
use the money to buy food. Generally, returnees stated 
in a focus group discussion that they felt left alone by 
service providers. When they returned in 2011 most 
of them had received aid for three months, which did 
not suffice to obtain self-sufficiency. 
But not only in Aweil did returnees face food  
insecurity; also in Bor. A 32 year old Dinka female  
returnee stated that there was hunger. The community 
leader of Bor town emphasized as well that shortage 
of water is the main concern in Bor among commu-
nity members. The returnees in Bor who had lost 
everything during the conflict in December 2013 and 
had no family members who could support them 
were reliant on food aid. Yet the single half-ration of 
food that was distributed by the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP) in cooperation with the local Relief 
and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) of the govern-
ment and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 
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urbanization has increased among South Sudanese 
(Pantuliano, Assal, Elnaiem, McElhinney, & Schwab, 
2011). Because displaced persons had lived in urban 
settings such as Khartoum or Kakuma15 during their 
exile, they are now more accustomed to an urban life 
style than a rural one. According to the author’s field 
research, returnees in all three sites, Juba, Bor and 
Aweil, saw more income-generating opportunities 
within the city than outside. Returnees furthermore 
complained about the lack of markets in rural areas 
where they could sell products or start businesses. 
Yet even in urban centres, transport in general 
has been a challenge. No public transport is available. 
In Juba the “boda boda” system—motorcyclists who 
can take one or two persons on the back of their  
motorcycle—used to be a cheap alternative to walking 
around. However due to the recent fuel shortages and 
high prices (Hoth Mai, Ting Mayai, & Tiitmamer, 2016) 
returnees and hosts alike can hardly afford this means 
of transportation. Transport is not only important to 
get individuals to the market, but also to transport 
products that, like firewood, are too heavy to carry.
Returnees and hosts in Aweil could only walk to 
the markets or hope to be able to borrow the bike that 
one of their community members had received from 
an NGO. Pushcarts were also used if available. Thus, 
returnees who lived very close to markets within the 
city faced fewer difficulties in generating an income 
than those who lived further away. 
This very move of returnees to urban areas has 
led to hostilities between the urban host community 
and newly arrived returnees because of competition 
over the few available income-generating activities. 
This had already been recorded in previous return 
movements after independence (Atari, Abdelnour, 
McKague, & Wager, 2009, p. 8; Haneef, 2013). Even the 
village saving loan system that enabled individuals 
to improve their financial situation with or without 
help from local NGOs led to conflicts that erupted 
over distribution of profit. Generating sustainable in-
come generally was a major challenge in achieving 
sustainable return for those interviewed.
15 \  Although Kakuma is a camp, it has taken on urban like characteristic 
after having been in place over years.
 access to land for housing and farming. Returnees  
often “started from zero” when they returned as their 
houses were destroyed and land has been lost. If not 
supported by a relative, returnees face difficulties in 
accessing land. Those difficulties are related to 1) land 
titles and ownership, 2) violent appropriation, 3) soil 
quality. Sometimes relatives have sold the land of the 
returnee while those were in exile. A woman in Aweil 
recounted that her son-in-law had done this. Although 
neighbours could serve as witnesses and could help 
in disputes over land, without proper documentation 
and proof, property and land issues are not easily  
resolved. Moreover, returnees often have no money to 
pay lawyers and to go to court. 
After independence, like in the first return wave 
after the CPA, tensions around access of land were 
common (Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, & Murphy, 
2007; Harild, Christensen, & Zetter, 2015, p. xii). Nuer 
returnees in Juba were hesitant to open a court case, 
even if they had the money, fearing revenge by Dinka 
who occupied their houses. In Bor, returning Dinka 
learned that Ugandan troops had taken over their 
houses, which also led to tensions between occupant 
and returnee. 
Tensions also emerged because of increased com-
petition between returnees and host communities 
over good quality of land. Returnees in Aweil were 
given land upon their return, yet the quality of land 
was poor as it was that prone to flooding that they 
had to relocate again. The land they settled on was 
then demarcated by the Ministry of Physical Infra-
structure, which forbade them to cultivate the land 
and to grow crops. In the end, they were able to grow 
okra, sorghum and groundnuts on land that was a 
three-hour walk away from where they lived and 
where there was no well. This contributed to the fact 
that they were not able to sustain themselves from 
their crops.
Generating an income
Most South Sudanese, including most returnees, 
have been living in rural areas. Yet upon their return, 
many returnees prefer to live in urban areas. Overall 
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In addition, returnees were not able to send money 
to their wives and children who had stayed in camps 
in neighbouring countries, such as Uganda or Kenya 
because of the high costs of living and a shortage of 
hard currency (Hoth Mai et al., 2016). A wife of a Dinka 
returnee in Juba, for example, was forced to return to 
Juba because her husband was not able to send her 
dollars to pay for treatment in a hospital in Uganda. 
Yet she would have preferred to stay in Uganda as she 
felt that the situation in Juba was too dangerous for 
her. Her husband and his friends were also concerned 
about security risks, yet they underlined that they 
would stay on as, contrary to their wives, they were 
“adult men” and had to support their families. But 
they also stated that if the security and economic  
situation did not improve, they would try to migrate 
to Australia or some other country where they would 
find more opportunities to find employment. 
Schooling and training
Another major challenge for generating income 
for returnees was the lack of skills. Although return-
ees in exile had to some part acquired relevant 
schooling and trainings at their host location, these 
skills were not always transferrable or needed at the 
return location. Others did not even have the oppor-
tunity to receive schooling or training at their host 
location. This was particularly true for IDPs outside 
the PoCs. The illiteracy rate in South Sudan is one of 
the highest in the world (UNICEF, 2016). Some inter-
national organizations also regretted that because of 
this they could not hire South Sudanese employees. 
Returnees from within South Sudan partly lacked the 
skills that were needed at the local return market. Re-
turnees from abroad instead often brought more 
skills with them than those that had stayed behind. 
Opportunities for schooling or trainings in Uganda, 
Ethiopia or Kenya were higher than in South Sudan. 
This led to rivalries for jobs between host and 
returnees.
This is partly due the lack in infrastructure, with 
marginal opportunities for higher education for re-
turnees and hosts. Either no secondary or tertiary 
school was nearby or the money was not available to 
Although South Sudan is rich in oil, fuel prices have skyrocketed (Hoth 
Mai et al., 2016). According to the World Bank (2016), South Sudan is 
the most oil-dependent country in the world. Yet because of “inade-
quate downstream infrastructure, management gaps, reduced hard 
currency earnings and high taxes and import duties among others” 
(Hoth Mai et al., 2016, p.2) coupled with global low oil prices, South 
Sudan has repeatedly faced fuel crises. The political disputes with  
Sudan and recent conflicts within South Sudan, particularly in Upper 
Nile, have exacerbated the situation (Hoth Mai et al., 2016). 
There is a general lack of employment opportuni-
ties for returnees and hosts in South Sudan. During 
focus group discussions, young men complained that 
they were frustrated at not finding any employment 
and to “just sitting around.” Even those who did find 
employment said the salary was not high enough to 
sustain them or their family. The high prices because 
of the current fiscal crisis made their salaries even 
less valuable. In December 2015, the inflation rate was 
at 110 per cent (Enough Project, 2016, p. 1). 
In addition, some income-generating activities 
were preferred over others, which led to competition 
over these jobs. For instance, returnees and hosts in-
dicated a preference for jobs at the United Nations, at 
an international NGO, or a “white-collar job” in “offic-
es” such as with the government. They preferred 
those over, for example, service provider jobs, as the 
former are the most highly paid and respectable jobs 
in their regard, although the government has lately 
not been able to pay the salaries of their employed 
either. 
Interviewees state that the chances of finding a 
job within the government have not been equal for 
all ethnic groups. The government has been very Din-
ka dominated and Nuer, for example, did not always 
have the same employment opportunities as Dinka 
had. Some Nuer also feared to take up a job within 
the government even if they could. Nuer returnees, 
who had had a job with the government before the 
outbreak of conflict in December 2013, stated that 
they were scared to return to their governmental  
position because of harassment and death threats.  
Box 2  
Oil—The resource paradox in South Sudan
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Marginalization and distrust
An additional major challenge to return as well as 
to reintegration has been the fear of marginalization 
at the return location. Displaced persons from the 
Nuer community in particular explained that they 
would not return to a county where Dinka dominated 
or where Nuer are not represented. Before the Nuer 
opposition leader of the SPLA-IO, Riek Machar, does 
not return to Juba, they do not see themselves repre-
sented in Juba in political terms and, thus, are also 
not ready to return. REACH (2015a) in their return in-
tention survey also documented that most displaced 
Nuer in the PoC 3 in Juba and in Bor rather preferred 
to return to counties where the majority are Nuer 
even though this might not be their pre-crisis home. 
Adelman (2002) already noted that minority return 
after the CPA was inhibited because of tensions be-
tween different ethnic groups, such as between Nuer 
and Dinka, as well as unequal power representation. 
The unilateral decision by President Salva Kiir to in-
crease the number of states of South Sudan from 10 to 
28 in the autumn of 2015 has also complicated the 
matter. Effects are changes in the ethnic composition 
of counties with new minorities feeling disadvan-
taged and clashing with the majority groups. 
Generally, the lack of trust between Nuer and 
Dinka prevailed. A Dinka returnee in Juba, for exam-
ple, feared that if he goes near the PoCs in Juba, “the 
Nuer would kill him”. Another Dinka Bor also stated 
that for him, the only problem in Bor where “the 
Nuer”. Nuer returnees themselves in Juba or Bor were 
worried to be near the respective other ethnic group. 
Only on Catholic Church grounds or at the university 
did they feel safe and would intermingle. When asked 
why these locations and not outside of these, they 
stated “it is a different world”. Recent reports have 
shown that even the university grounds are no longer 
safe (Sudan Tribune, 13-06-2016). 
pay for further education. Generally, returnees also 
mentioned the shortfall of scholarship programmes. 
In addition, returnees and hosts complained about 
the lack of teachers and qualified staff. As teachers of-
ten worked on a voluntarily basis as salaries were not 
paid by the government, teachers missed classes or 
were not “very motivated” in their work. Government 
spending has been ‘redirected’ from education to the 
military (Enough Project, 2016; Paes, 2014). Yet, wom-
en complained about even more basic obstacles to at-
tending classes, such as the lack of latrines for wom-
en at the education facilities. 
While aid organizations have provided primary 
education as well as vocational trainings to the dis-
placed and to host communities, recent returnees are 
not included in their programmes. In addition, a 
number of shortcomings of those trainings have 
been observed. First, trainings have been very short, 
restricted to a few days that were not always suffi-
cient to fully apprehend the matter. Second, if train-
ing was offered by local aid providers there was some-
times disagreement over who of their community 
should participate in trainings or develop their skills 
further. Third, trainings were often restricted to one 
kind of activity, such as farming, that was only help-
ful for one season of the year, but not for another. 
Fourth, trainings of women for carpentry were use-
less as local firms did not “trust” women to do the job. 
Fifth, aid organizations neglected young men in their 
programmes. According to the author’s observations 
this frustrated them even more as they were already 
marginalized by the “patriarchal cultural attitudes of 
the older generations-most of them in key govern-
ment positions who do not value youth for the great 
resource they are” (Akau, 2015). Many youths see their 
only opportunity for sustaining themselves and their 
family through criminal activity. Particular around 
Juba, but also in Wau, criminal activity has skyrocketed 
recently.
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return or early returnees as observed in Bor and Juba 
are not foreseen in the current aid structure that is 
focused on emergency and not relief work. In the early 
stage of return, returnees are hence left alone and 
need to rely more on kinship assistance or own assets. 
With return not being a linear process (Bailey & 
Harragin, 2009, p.18), one can identify different “stages”. 
Reintegration is generally considered a major part of 
it. Reintegration is also considered to be a “necessary 
precondition” for sustainable return (Koser &  
Kuschminder, 2015, p. 49). The findings from the field 
research also demonstrate that return does not  
always follow the same pattern, but instead can be 
diverse. 
Diverse patterns of return exist
The field research findings demonstrate that  
return does not always follow the same pattern, but 
rather is diverse. The following return patterns have 
been identified during the field research in South  
Sudan and Ethiopia.16
   \ Refugees who have fled to the neighbouring countries 
of Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya and who 
have returned since the beginning of 2015.17   
Returnees from further away have not been  
recorded as only few South Sudanese have 
sought asylum in Europe. In 2015, there were 50 
asylum seekers in Europe, ten of whom went to 
Germany (Eurostat, 2016). 
   \ IDP returnees, where return can mean the return 
of refugees and IDPs alike. Most of those who 
had fled during the 2013 conflict returned from 
within South Sudan by the autumn of 2015. 
Many of those who have returned to Juba had 
been displaced in the “bush” near the border to 
Uganda or in the PoCs in Juba. Others have  
returned to Bor from Juba or from the sponta-
neous IDP settlement of Mingkaman. IDPs 
sometimes return earlier than refugees because 
they can access information about their return 
location more easily and have a lesser distance 
to travel, which also reduces the cost of 
16 \  As the study was restricted to four research sites, more patterns 
might exist.
17 \  Exact numbers are not available.
While above observations and voices from the 
field only represent a snapshot limited in space 
(three locations in South Sudan and two in Ethiopia), 
time (autumn of 2015) and cases, they still provide 
some insights into the challenges facing the sustain-
ability of return. As return currently does not seem to 
be an option for many displaced persons as the secu-
rity situation has rather worsened than improved, it 
is an opportunity for lessons learned from these  
results, to compare them to earlier findings and to 
possibly help aid agencies to address future return 
movements. 
Before the various forms of return are discussed, 
the author would like to make a general remark on 
“return” itself. The term ‘return’ can be misleading as 
it implies a “moving back” or a “reversal “ (UNHCR, 
2008, p. 1). But return does not necessarily mean  
return to the pre-crisis or ancestral home, but can 
mean settling in a new location. 
Return is a process
The observations of the field research in Aweil, 
Bor and Juba in South Sudan and within Gambella in 
Ethiopia underline that the voluntary return of dis-
placed persons does not automatically start with the 
signing of a peace agreement. Some have already  
returned before that, often, they return while some 
fighting is still going on (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 2; 
Macrae, 1999, p.1) while others may only return once 
fighting has stopped. It also means that not all dis-
placed persons can and want to return, particularly 
as the trust in the peace process is not high among 
the displaced, such as in Gambella. Consequently, 
“peace on paper does not necessarily mean peace on 
the ground” (Bohnet, 2016b) and return cannot be 
considered as a signal for peace. Return, therefore, 
has no clear beginning or end. 
Despite the fact that the return of displaced per-
sons does not automatically coincide with the signing 
of a peace agreement, the agendas of aid agencies in 
South Sudan are often still structured along conflict 
and post-conflict scenarios. As shown above, this 
does not reflect reality on the ground. Spontaneous 
Field research findings: Lessons to be learned
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belonged to the different ethnicity, were not 
considered a “threat” as it was assumed that 
they would not fight. This also shows that not 
all family members or displaced persons return 
at the same time.
   \ Many family members do not necessarily return to-
gether, but return at different times or remain apart. 
In Juba, for example, male returnees stated 
that their wives and children were still in 
Uganda in a camp or in a village near the border 
as. The men found it too dangerous for the 
women to return (see chapter on security 
above). Still, the men returned as they searched 
for job opportunities to support their family. 
Nuer returnees from the PoCs in Juba stated 
that their wives, too, still stayed inside the 
PoCs as they considered it too unsafe for their 
family to return. In addition, some family 
members stayed in the neighbouring countries 
as it was easier to gain access to schooling. As 
part of the family might stay in a settlement 
for displaced people, returnees might thus also 
move back from time to time to visit their family 
members. Consequently, return cannot be con-
sidered as static. Harild et al. (2015) also point 
out that families divide themselves up before 
return to build a livelihood for the future return 
of those that have stayed behind.  
Harpviken (2014) furthermore underlines that 
“split return” is a common strategy of return. It 
is used as a coping strategy to minimize risk 
factors.
   \ Some displaced persons are half way on their journey 
to the return location, and others return back and 
forth. Nuer students from the University of 
Juba, for example, returned only to the city for 
the day and went back to the PoC site in the 
evening. But displaced persons not only moved 
between locations within a county or state in 
South Sudan but also between international 
borders, such as between Uganda and South 
Sudan. Displacement therefore cannot be un-
derstood to have “neat endings and beginnings 
(Johnson et al., 2016, p.8). The same is true for 
return as the findings from the field research 
travelling. In turn, knowing about their pre-
ferred return location can also mean that they 
do not want to return as they know that it is 
still not secure. Yet, when returning, displaced 
persons seem to prefer to know about the situ-
ation of the return location rather than not 
knowing at all. Knowing what to expect makes 
them judge the situation at the return location 
more realistically. 
Due to the fact that return also entails settling in 
new locations, it is important that one does not only 
speak of reintegration as part of the return process, but 
also of local integration. 
   \ The choice of the return location can be influ-
enced by individual characteristics of the displaced 
person, such as ethnicity gender and age. Displaced 
Nuer from Bor, for example, stated that they 
did not want to return to Bor, their pre-crisis 
home, but preferred to settle in Ayod or Akobo 
because they felt safer and are not marginalized 
there because there they belong to the ethnic 
majority, while in Bor, the ethnic majority is 
Dinka. The REACH intention survey done in  
November 2015 (REACH, 2015a), which shows 
that most displaced Nuer in Bor do not want to 
return to their pre-crisis home, Bor, but rather 
to a new place, supports this observation. That 
individual characteristics can influence the 
choice of return location has also been empha-
sized, for example, by Black et al. (2004), Ruben, 
van Houte, & Davids (2009) and Cassarino 
(2004), although they did not took ethnicity in 
account. Just as the destination location of dis-
placed persons may be influenced by ethnic 
ties (Rüegger & Bohnet, 2015), the findings of 
this field research support the notion that the 
same holds true for return locations. While in 
Juba, for instance, mainly young men have  
returned from the “bush” or from Uganda or 
Kenya, or from the PoCsite in Juba, it has been 
the other way around in Bor. There, mainly 
women have returned from the PoC. Several  
interviewees reasoned that in Bor, “young Nuer 
men” would be seen as a “threat” to the dominant 
presence of Dinka. Women, even though they 
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community because of their higher education oppor-
tunities in exile that possibly equip them with needed 
skills at the return location.
Furthermore, the results show that the relation of 
the returnees to the host community can play a crucial 
role in their reintegration and return process. As  
Cernea (2000, p. 32) points out, the risks of impover-
ishment of the host community may not be identical 
to that of the returnees, but they can be related to 
them and result in impoverishment implications. 
Cernea (2000) and refugee and conflict researchers 
alike have argued (see, for example Bohnet, 2015;  
Lischer, 2005; Rüegger, 2013; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 
2006) that the inflow of displaced persons can increase 
pressure on resources and create competition over  
income-generating activities, which may result in 
conflict between displaced and hosts. This has been 
seen in the case of Gambella where Nuer refugees 
have again and again clashed with the Anuak host 
population. The author has observed the same at the 
three field research locations in South Sudan for  
returnees. As pointed out in chapter three, violent 
disputes were recorded in Aweil over access to water, 
in Juba over land and property and in Bor over aid 
services. Consequently, the relation of returnees and 
hosts can have a significant impact on the reintegra-
tion process of returnees and its sustainability. Violent 
conflict between hosts and returnees can force the 
returnee to flee again or force the host to flee.
Lischer (2011), examining the return of Tutsi refu-
gees to Uganda, was one of the first who recognized 
that displaced persons may also constitute security 
risks upon return. While returnees can bring skills 
and knowledge with them that help the local com-
munity and economy (Ashkenazi, Farha, Isikozlu, 
Radeke, & Rush, 2006, p. 11), they can also create com-
petition and tensions. In the 2016 Peace Report, Bohnet 
(2016a) already showed the conflict risks that can and 
have come about in relation to the return of displaced 
from and within South Sudan. While these tensions 
not necessarily escalate into large-scale violence,  
reports of violent attacks, gunshot injuries and 
deaths are not uncommon.
show. Other returnees have moved, for example, 
from the displaced persons site Mingkaman to 
Bor for a while but plan to return to their 
pre-crisis home in Duk or Twic East County. Yet, 
as insecurity prevailed in their home locations 
and neither schools or job opportunities nor 
markets were available at their home locations, 
they decided to stay in Bor until the situation 
at home improves. This also applied to some 
returnees from neighbouring countries who 
first stopped in Juba but eventually wanted to 
move back to their home county in Unity or 
Upper Nile state.
   \ A trend towards an urbanization of returnees can 
be observed, although the majority still lives in 
rural settings. The reasons being that returnees, 
because of their experience in exile, now feel 
more accustomed to an urban life style than a 
rural one and see greater job opportunities in 
cities.  
In sum, patterns of return in South Sudan are not 
always the same and are not necessarily static. Return 
patterns can depend on the individual characteristics 
of the returnee, such as ethnicity, gender or age. Par-
ticular return patterns are furthermore used as coping 
strategies of returnees, such as splitting up family 
members and moving between displacement and  
return locations back and forth.
Host communities are in similar vulner-
able circumstances as returnees
Some aid organizations and refugee scholars  
(Koser & Kuschminder, 2015, p. 48; UNHCR, 2004, p. 3) 
assume that returnees are reintegrated and that return 
has been sustainable when their situation is similar 
to that of the local communities that receive them. 
Yet field research observations made in South Sudan 
demonstrate that similar situations of the two do not 
necessarily indicate that the returnees have been sus-
tainably reintegrated. In South Sudan, the host popu-
lation is itself often impoverished; with no jobs and 
food. While it is true that returnees might be more 
vulnerable as, for example, they have lost their land, 
they may be even better off than members of the host 
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They rather refer to the returnees as “the people from 
Khartoum” or the “North”. 
However, while tensions between returnees and 
hosts can come about, disputes among returnees 
themselves, for example, over the service provision 
during the return and reintegration process in Aweil, 
have also been reported during the field research.  
Often only very few could take part in programmes, 
such as vocational training, some only received a 
shovel and others only plastic sheeting while others 
received both upon return. This unequal treatment of 
returnees led to clashes. 
Unsurprisingly, the author observed competition 
between returnees and displaced persons in South 
Sudan as most aid agencies until the autumn of 2015 
had concentrated their efforts on emergency aid for 
displaced persons, but had not included returnees in 
their programmes.
The findings of the field research indicate that 
tensions among returnees, between returnees, dis-
placed or hosts occurred mainly due to competition 
over and access to resources. Therefore, the author 
feels confident to suggest that accessibility to  
resources for all groups is essential to reduce tensions 
and to foster sustainable return. With access to  
resources, livelihood opportunities increase and are 
more easily secured. The author therefore expects 
that the sustainability of return, and along with it  
reintegration as part of the return process, is greater 
if livelihood opportunities are available at the return 
location. 
Johnson et al. (2016), who also focus on displace-
ment in South Sudan, also observe that the general 
lack of opportunities create “an environment where 
it is easy to mobilize dissent, especially among the 
youth”. And as young people, particularly young men, 
hosts or returnees, are often not included in aid pro-
grammes as they are not considered “vulnerable”, it 
is understandable that they become disillusioned. As 
small arms are readily available in South Sudan, there 
is plenty of opportunity to mobilize, which lowers the 
threshold to engage in violence as also argued in the 
conflict literature (see, for example, Fearon & Laitin, 
2003).
Resources are already scarce at the return locations 
in South Sudan, and the number of returnees exacer-
bate this situation. Grievance levels rise and with it 
the motivation to engage in violence to gain access to 
the limited resources. Although generally aid services 
are not far from where returnees are, aid agencies 
have not paid much attention to returnees to South 
Sudan until the autumn of 2015. In the conflict litera-
ture, the fact that pressure on resources can create 
higher grievance levels is well known (see, for example: 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Raleigh & Hegre, 2009) and 
this argument has also been supported by the refugee 
literature (see, for example: Bohnet, 2015; Lebson, 
2010; Mogire, 2011). Tensions over resources might be 
more likely when returnees and hosts belong to differ-
ent ethnicities, such as Dinka and Nuer, as host popu-
lations are often more receptive to those with whom 
they share ethnic kinship (Newland, 1993). Yet, John 
(2010) analyzing Sudanese returnees from Kenya to 
Southern Sudan finds that returnees and hosts “do 
not fight just because they are different culturally or 
otherwise” (p. 183) but to defend their scarce resources, 
material or non-material. Nevertheless, ethnic divides 
are clearly visible in South Sudan. 
Yet, while divisions between returnees and hosts 
can be identified, the line between return and dis-
placement in South Sudan cannot always be easily 
drawn as people’s movements are dynamic as seen 
from the different patterns of return described above. 
For example, while in Aweil, the separation between 
returnees and hosts is more pronounced where  
returnees have been in exile over years, in Bor this 
separation has been not that prominent. In Bor, almost 
everyone is a returnee as everyone had fled from vio-
lence in the winter of 2013/2014. Only some returned 
earlier than others.
The distinction between returnees and hosts 
comes from the aid and donor structure that differ-
entiates between these groups. Interestingly, “return-
ees” themselves do not actually use the word “returnee” 
or only started to use it after they were introduced to 
it by aid organizations. For example, in Aweil, a member 
of the Dinka ethnic group explained that in the Dinka 
language there is actually no expression for returnee. 
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The context of the return location is 
crucial for the return process
The results of the field research show that besides 
individual characteristics and experience during dis-
placement, the sustainability of return depends largely 
on the return location, be it ancestral, pre-crisis or a 
new location. This also applies to Burundi (Lukunka, 
2013, p. 18). 
The context of the return location is mainly 
about economic, social and political factors, such as 
access to food and employment. While there is no 
general agreement on the components of sustainable 
return (and reintegration), there seems to be a con-
sensus among scholars (see, for example, Rogge, 1994) 
that economic, social and political factors at the  
return location are crucial for sustainable return. 
This seems also to be true for South Sudan. 
Even though economic and social elements can 
play a role in the return and reintegration process, 
some might be more important than others for the 
individual. Generally, the different factors of reinte-
gration must not be regarded as independent of each 
other. Instead, they influence each other and are  
interlinked. Reintegration is thus a “complex multi- 
dimensional process” (Ruben et al., 2009); this is why 
scholars also speak of mixed embeddedness instead 
of reintegration. But how can a returnee be embedded 
or sustainably reintegrated? Which factors play a 
more prominent and which ones play a minor role in 
the context of South Sudan? 
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Observations and interviews conducted during 
the field research indicate that first, basic needs, such 
as food and water are essential for sustainable return, 
followed by long-term livelihood opportunities 
through access to land, jobs, education and markets. 
Therefore economic factors seem to play a particular 
strong role in the return process and context of South 
Sudan. 
Access to food 
In all three return locations, Aweil, Juba and Bor, 
returnees and hosts had poor access to food in the  
autumn of 2015, which limited their livelihood oppor-
tunities, showing that the sustainability level for re-
turnees is not high at all. Juba, as the capital, does 
provide some more opportunities than others but 
Despite diverse patterns of return, there are similar 
challenges to sustainable return and (re)-integration 
as the findings of the field research show in the  
chapter on Risks of and challenges to sustainable  
return (pp. 15 ff.). However, dependent on their expe-
riences and the returnee location, some challenges 
may be more difficult than others. In the following, 
this study tries to identify the livelihood situation of 
returnees and the main challenges to sustainable  
return in South Sudan in the autumn and winter of 
2015 by analysing and comparing the field research 
findings (pp. 21 ff) with previous research and  
Cernea’s risk factors of impoverishment (2000) as laid 
out in the Methodology. The Paper measures sustaina-
ble return on the individual level; therefore, the chal-
lenges may be different for a family, household or 
community as the composition of individuals varies. 
The livelihood situation of South Sudanese returnees: 
A question of accessibility to resources
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Sudanese not only to emigrate to Khartoum but also 
to Uganda (Golla, 2016).
In Bor, food security and the sustainability of rein-
tegration does not seem promising either. As observed 
in autumn 2015, returnees only received food aid for 
two weeks, which did not help them in their efforts to 
become self-sufficient, especially as most of the return-
ees came without any assets. Late rains in Jonglei  
delayed planting of sorghum and other seeds even 
more (Sudan Tribune, 07-06-2016).
Food insecurity has not only been a reason for  
renewed displacement in South Sudan but can also 
hinder displaced people in their return as observed 
during the field research. Returnees in Bor move  
between food distribution locations in Mingkaman as 
food distribution is not sufficient in Bor. The REACH  
return intention survey (2015) also found out that besides 
security, food insecurity was the major factor for not 
returning.
Already in a previous study done by Ashkenazi et 
al. (2006) on return to four counties in South Sudan 
(Yei River, West Juba, Maridi and Mundri), the authors 
found that water and food insecurity were the main 
challenges to reintegration. The same has been  
observed by Pantuliano et al. (2007). Cernea (2000) 
considers food insecurity also as one of the impover-
ishment risks. The interviews conducted during field 
research underline these findings. 
Food aid, consequently, is likely to play a signifi-
cant role in the return and reintegration process as 
emphasized by Bailey & Harragin (2009). The problem, 
however, is that aid is “often too little, too late or  
entirely absent” (p. 2). It often is “too late” as returnees 
need to be registered to receive food aid while sponta-
neous returnees are not. Especially, before a peace 
agreement has been signed, returnees are rarely regis-
tered. The author observed this in Bor. In addition, 
three-months of aid that is normally given during  
assisted return are often insufficient as observed in 
Aweil. Food aid raises “fears of dependency” with aid 
organizations (Bailey & Harragin, 2009, p. 2), but  
because “it is too little and too unreliable” (Bailey & 
Harragin, 2009, p. 2), the fear is not warranted in South 
Sudan. 
due to the recent insecurity in Juba itself, these op-
portunities have also become less. It appears that 
therefore, in all locations and for all types of returnees, 
access to food appears to be the main challenge for 
sustainable return.
While food insecurity might not be considered 
necessarily a trigger of displacement, it can be a driv-
er of it and thus, endanger sustainability of return, 
too, if defined as not being forced to migrate again. 
“Drivers” are less visible, but can also lead to displace-
ment (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre & 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015). Cernea (2000), too, 
considers food insecurity as an impoverishment risk.
Despite the fact that the numbers of people that 
are classified as severely food insecure in South Sudan 
have shrunk overall, an estimated 2.8 million, that is 
23 per cent of the population, still face extreme food 
insecurity. This is true for returnees and hosts alike. 
In the summer of 2016, the situation in the entire 
country got even worse. Some areas, like Northern 
Bahr Ghazal where Aweil is located, have moved from 
‘stressed’ to ‘crisis’ classification (Integrated Food  
Security Phase Classification, 2016a, 2016b). Northern 
Bahr Ghazal thus represents a case where return has 
not been sustainable and food insecurity has been a 
driver for renewed displacement and tension. During 
field research in Aweil in the autumn of 2015, it became 
apparent that returnees and host were severely food 
insecure. Those who returned from Khartoum after 
independence live side by side with stayees with dif-
ferent ethnicity, and their livelihood situation is similar 
to that of the local population. Many interviewees 
stated that they did not know how to make it to the 
next season. Many aid organizations had left as they 
assumed that the returnees had already reintegrated. 
According to their assessments, the situation of return-
ees did not differ much from that of the host popula-
tion. The people in Aweil were left on their own  
because donors and aid agencies prioritized other areas. 
Not surprisingly, UNHCR states that since late January 
of 2016 over 69,000 people have been forced to migrate 
from South Sudan, particularly Northern Bahr Ghazal 
and Warrap states to Sudan for the search of better 
food security. Yet, food insecurity forced South 
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Access to jobs
Besides access to land, access to jobs can help  
returnees to sustain their livelihood and, thus, to 
(re)integrate. Cernea (2000) points to joblessness as a 
further risk factor of impoverishment. Without a job, 
returnees  cannot afford the high food prices (Enough 
Project, 2016). In addition, the general economy is  
collapsing (Golla, 2016) and government spending is 
still skewed towards the military and security 
(Enough Project, 2016; Paes, 2014) instead of economic 
development or education. 
The few jobs that are available are not accessible 
to all as outlined above. Akau (2015) also emphasizes 
that the “patriarchal cultural attitudes of the older 
generations-most of them in key government posi-
tions” (p. 1) neglect the young people. This patronage 
system and kleptocracy existed before the conflict of 
2013 and still exists today (see Waal, 2015) and reduces 
job opportunities for the youth and some ethnic 
groups that are marginalized, such as Shilluks. This 
can lead, and has led, to frustration among the youth 
and the excluded ethnic groups, returnees and hosts 
alike, which makes them more susceptible to mobili-
zation. This system is the reason why many displaced 
persons do not return as they know that circum-
stances for them have not changed, and the same  
system is still in place (Johnson et al., 2016, p. 6). Not 
surprisingly, many youth groups have organized 
themselves and use violence to make them heard. But 
even student groups, for example at the University of 
Juba, that were newly formed to express their objec-
tions have encountered clashes with or intimidation 
by national security forces (Sudan Tribune, 13-06-2016). 
And even those who have a job often do not get 
paid or their salary is not enough to sustain them 
and their family. Traditionally, one income-generating 
activity was not always enough to guarantee food  
security. Different seasons required different income- 
generating measures. Yet, despite the job shortage, 
some preferred some jobs, such as working for an  
international organization, over others as they  
believed that salaries were higher. 
Access to land
Access to resources, such as land or livestock, is 
part of one crucial coping strategy when it comes to 
guaranteeing food security in South Sudan. As Ruben 
et al. (2009) also observed for 178 returnees of six dif-
ferent origin countries (Afghanistan, Armenia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Togo and Vietnam) 
successful economic re-embeddness  “requires access 
to resources, opportunities and basic services to  
establish a self-sustained livelihood” (p. 915). These 
can be, as Pantuliano et al. (2007) writes, a) livestock 
and agriculture production, b) the sustainable use of 
natural resources, c) access to employment and d) estab-
lishment of small businesses. However, while livestock 
is a major income for South Sudanese, those that had 
cattle before the conflict have in the majority of cases 
lost it. The Protection Cluster South Sudan (2016), 
which coordinates the humanitarian protection 
activities for IDPs in South Sudan, thus fears that the 
frequency and intensity of cattle raids will also increase 
as people returning will reclaim their cattle that has 
been taken (p. 1).
The same is true for other property, such as fertile 
and accessible land. The author has observed conflicts 
around land between returnees and hosts in all three 
return locations, Aweil, Bor and Juba. These observa-
tions are corroborated by an independent impact 
evaluation of a UNHCR community-based reintegra-
tion programme in South Sudan. Also O´Hagan (2011, 
p. 23), points out that land occupation has been a 
problem. Ashkenazi et al. (2006, p. 11) underlines gen-
eral competition over productive land between return-
ees and hosts. So, when returnees have no access to 
land, they cannot grow anything that would guarantee 
food security. In consequence, sustainable return is 
threatened. For this reason, Cernea (2000) sees land-
lessness also as an impoverishment risk. While he 
names landlessness and food security as two different 
risks, they can be directly interlinked: Access to land 
can help the returnee to secure food. Nevertheless, 
having land is not sufficient to guarantee 
sustainability. 
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& Söderbom, 2008, p. 461), and economic reintegration 
is a key issue in the process of return (Rogge, 1994). 
Cernea (2000) also states, “settling displaced back on 
cultivable land or in income generating employment 
is the heart of the matter in reconstructing liveli-
hoods” (p. 35). 
Still, economic reintegration factors cannot be 
analyzed on their own. They are dependent on social 
networks and aid services provided.
Social networks: Family and ethnic ties
If returnees can neither rely on aid services pro-
vided by the local government nor by aid organizations, 
they are all the more reliant on social ties, such as 
family, relatives or ethnic group, especially in the early 
stages of return.18 Most of the recent spontaneous  
returnees interviewed in Bor and Juba stated that 
they live on land or of food from relatives. The same 
is true for those with low salaries or none at all who 
could not sustain themselves on their own in view of 
the fact that most returnees return without any assets. 
Many who had any assets before used the little money 
they had for their return journey. Only very few could 
benefit from some seed capital that they had left. 
Those who were moving to a new location, often had 
no family ties at all, but, if they were lucky, could rely 
on support by ethnic kin members.
Social networks can define the way returnees  
mobilize resources (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015, p. 60; 
Ruben et al., 2009, p. 915) and, in consequence, also  
influence the livelihood opportunities of returnees 
and with it, their sustainability. As also Cassarino 
(2004) states: Social structures “increase the availabil-
ity of resources and information” (p. 10). Therefore, 
economic reintegration cannot be separated from  
social aspects. Johnson et al. (2016, p. iii) also found 
out that many displaced persons in Jonglei use kinship 
networks to get accommodation and food. The author 
observed the same pattern with refugees during her 
field research. John (2010) defines reintegration as 
the process of “remixing” and “forging closer rela-
tions and cooperation in a society” (p. 181) and equal-
izes access to resources with reintegration (p. 179). 
18 \  See section on ‚Water and food‘, pp. 16 ff
Access to education
Access to education and education itself is closely 
linked to that to jobs: Without (higher) education it 
is difficult to get the jobs that are available. While 
some returnees, mostly refugee returnees who had 
access to education in their exile had better job  
opportunities upon their return, many IDPs outside 
PoCs did not have that chance. But not all skills 
match with the requirements at the local market. 
Even trainings some aid organizations offered to 
some returnees could later not be used at their return 
location. A problem also observed in DDR programming 
(Breitung et al., 2016, p. 19). While Cernea (2000) did 
not include loss of educational opportunities as an 
impoverishment risk, it seems to be a major issue in 
the context of South Sudan. Koser & Kuschminder 
(2015, p. 55) describe that there is a significant relation-
ship between education and reintegration for refugee 
returnees to Sudan and Ethiopia.
Access to markets
Besides education and linked to the accessibility 
of jobs to guarantee food security and establish liveli-
hoods, is the access to markets and with it, the general 
infrastructure at the return location. In several state-
ments made by interviewees the access to markets 
was mentioned as a main obstacle to generate an  
income which is a similar outcome as reported by 
Pantuliano et al. (2007) and Ashkenazi et al. (2006, p. 18). 
In sum, the access to markets, jobs, education and 
land determine to a large extent the food security 
and livelihood situation of the returnees and, thus, 
also their level of reintegration and sustainability. 
Each of these factors can influence one another. The 
level of education, for instance, can determine the  
accessibility of jobs, and the access to markets can  
influence job opportunities. Therefore, one can put 
them under the umbrella of ‘economic factors of  
reintegration and return.’ It seems that in the context 
of South Sudan, economic reintegration is crucial to 
guaranteeing sustainability. Several other authors 
have stressed the importance of economic recovery, 
especially in “post-conflict” contexts (Collier, Hoeffler, 
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Political exclusion
As explained above, in South Sudan, the accessi-
bility to jobs, particularly in government, is often  
determined by power- and ethnic relations. Displaced 
persons who are politically marginalized are thus  
reluctant to return and often lack livelihood oppor-
tunities and, if they return, cannot reintegrate sus-
tainably. This is corroborated by Pantuliano et al. 
(2007) who argue that successful reintegration of  
returnees depends on the ability to access and partic-
ipate in local governance (p. 9). Kälin (2008) further 
emphasizes that, as IDPs have been a party to the 
conflict, their inclusion is necessary to resolve it and 
make return sustainable. If a group, such as the youth, 
is politically or socially excluded and their voices are 
not heard, as has been shown above, violent clashes 
with groups in power can evolve (see also International 
Organization for Migration, 2013, p. 44). 
The peace deal of August 2015 was largely focused 
on finding a power-sharing relationship between Kiir 
and Machar, marginalizing others on the way (Young, 
2015, p. 35-36). Therefore, recent violence and renewed 
displacement does not come as a surprise. Pendle 
(2016) emphasizes, too, that previous peace agreements 
“have [only] reshuffled power between a circle of […]
notorious elites” and “have little connection to the 
reality of the ever more complex struggles of South 
Sudanese”. 
While Cernea (2000) underlines social exclusion 
as an impoverishment risk, he does not include polit-
ical exclusion. Yet, “voicelessness” and political exclu-
sion seems to play a critical role in the context of 
South Sudan and, thus, voicelessness could also be 
considered a risk factor to sustainability there. The 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (2015, p. 4) also consider 
political drivers to be the most common form of 
displacement.
The unilateral decision by President Kiir to create 
28 states instead of the current 10 already shows that 
unilateral decisions can have effects on the return 
and reintegration of displaced persons, such as Nuer 
not wanting to return to Bor. If this decision is fully 
implemented, it will have further repercussions for 
returnees (Arensen, 2016, p. 66). That minority return 
Still, as observed during the author’s field research, 
having family ties at the return location does not  
automatically mean that returnees are better reinte-
grated or indeed get help from their relatives. While 
Koser & Kuschminder (2015) observe that “acceptance 
by family is an essential part of reintegration upon 
return” (p. 57) Lukunka (2013) describes for return in 
Burundi that the lack of acceptance by the host com-
munity hinders social integration and can have econ-
omic repercussions. It has already been shown above 
that the relationship with the host community plays 
an important role in the return and reintegration 
process. If hosts and returnees are not treated the same 
by aid organizations or if competition increases be-
cause of pressures on resources, tensions will be likely. 
Furthermore, socially marginalized, displaced 
persons might not even return or will have more  
difficulty during reintegration. Unmarried pregnant 
women find it particularly difficult to be accepted by 
the host community in South Sudan upon return. In 
general, John (2010, p. 182) points out that if displaced 
persons believe that they will not be accepted by their 
return community, they will also be not compelled to 
return. Cernea (2000), therefore, also considers “social 
disarticulation” as an impoverishment risk. While he, 
however, includes reconciliation under social disar-
ticulation, he does not explicitly address trauma- 
healing. Yet, because of decades of conflict and  
renewed violence, many South Sudanese experience 
psychological distress (Amnesty International, 2016,  
p. 8). While the level of psychological distress is hard 
to measure, and there is not sufficient experienced 
staff who could identify symptoms of trauma, findings 
of the field research indicate that many people gener-
ally no longer trust others because of what they had 
experienced themselves or had seen done to their  
relatives or friends. This can be a “destabilizing force” 
(Amnesty International, 2016, p. 9) to social relations. 
Moreover, Breitung et al. (2016) note that fighting 
within the SPLA erupted so easily in 2013 as the “SPLA 
was never reconciled” and “there has never been a 
nation-wide healing process by which these deep 
rifts could have been addressed” (p. 22). 
Without trust between groups and additional 
trauma-healing, sharing of resources remains a 
difficulty. 
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can be problematic has also been argued by Adelman 
& Barkan (2011). At the end of 2014, the government of 
South Sudan had already blocked the planned return 
of displaced persons in the PoCs in Bor and Wau to 
Akobo, Leer and Pagak, as they feared that that they 
would strengthen the opposition that operated in 
these areas. 
While the peace deal of August 2015 explicitly 
states that the transitional government “from its  
inception shall address challenges of repatriation,  
resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
IDPs and returnees” and prohibits “acts of hostility, 
intimidation, violence or attacks” against displaced 
persons and returnees (Agreement on the Resolution 
of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 2015), a 
concrete strategy of how to do this is lacking (Bohnet, 
2016a, p. 134). Moreover, the political will of the top 
leaders and personal integrity (Waal, 2015) is missing, 
as it had before during previous return movements 
(Pantuliano et al., 2007, p. 9). According to the peace 
deal, a special reconstruction fund (SRF) is to be  
established that prepares a detailed action, but no 
plan is in sight. 
While the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
(RRC), which is the local government agency responsible 
for return and reintegration in South Sudan, is active 
on the local level, no efforts are being made on the cen-
tral level to include the interests of different displaced 
groups. The peace process in South Sudan has generally 
been an elite process and the question remains of how 
sustainable the return of displaced persons can be if 
the political dimension is not addressed. While Adelman 
(2002) argues that refugee return does not need to be 
addressed in peace agreements (p. 273), he points out 
that the issue of return is not a marginal, but rather a 
“complicating factor, with many different dimensions, 
in the successful implementation of the peace agree-
ment” (p. 296).  While returnees might be reintegrated 
in one aspect, they might not be in another and, in 
consequence, are not fully reintegrated, especially not 
sustainably. 
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As resources overall are very scarce in South Sudan 
because of a collapsing economy, competition over  
resources are on the daily agenda. Because of that, 
crime rates have also risen dramatically. Unemploy-
ment is high and food insecurity is omnipresent. As 
returnees put more pressure on resources, and liveli-
hood opportunities are few for most South Sudanese, 
they regularly engage in violence to defend the 
scarce resources between returnees and hosts, but 
also among returnees, as they did in the past, aided 
by the easy access to small arms, which also facilitates 
mobilization. Ethnic divisions and mistrust between 
groups further exacerbate these tensions. 
The political will on the government level might 
be missing to foster political inclusion and guarantee 
equal access to resources and it does not look as if the 
situation were going to change soon. Yet international 
and national aid organizations as well as local gov-
ernment agencies will have to strive to act at least on 
the local level. As the current situation seems to be 
unfavourable to return, it will give aid agencies the 
opportunity to learn from the past and adapt aid  
assistance for future return movements.
To reduce the risk of renewed tensions between 
returnees and hosts, the author recommends aid  
organizations and local government agencies to
   \ include the host community in the (re)-inte-
gration process of returnees, 
   \ include the young people, especially young men,
   \ promote livelihood opportunities and guarantee 
quality and diversification,
   \ be pro-active and start early development 
programmes,
   \ do not neglect the psychological dimension of 
reintegration.19
As described in this Working Paper, sustainable  
return is a long process with different components 
(economic, social, political and psychological). 
Achieving that return indeed becomes a durable solu-
tion the political will needs to be there to guarantee 
accessibility to all groups of returnees and hosts 
which currently however does not seem to be the 
case. In addition, donor structures of aid agencies 
 
19 \  See also Recommendations, p. 6
In conclusion, the findings of the two-and-a-half-
months field research in the autumn of 2015 in South 
Sudan and Ethiopia indicate that return is not a simple, 
linear or necessarily durable solution for displaced 
persons; be it for refugees or internally displaced  
persons. It is rather a complex process with different 
patterns and dimensions. People may be at the half-
way point in their return or move between displace-
ment and return locations, which shows that neither 
displacement nor return have clear endings or begin-
nings. As the author’s definition of return stipulates, 
return can also mean that displaced people move to a 
new location, which in turn means that return is also 
linked to local integration. Aid agencies have to adapt 
to these diverse return patterns by acting pro-actively 
and by being flexible in their programmes.
Moreover, for return to be durable, it needs to be 
sustainable. The paper aimed to investigate what sus-
tainable return in the context of South Sudan entails 
and what challenges it faces. The results of individual 
in-depth interviews with displaced persons and host 
communities demonstrate that sustainable return 
besides individual factors, such as gender, age and 
ethnicity, largely depend on the economic, social and 
political context at the return location. While the 
field research observations can only provide a snap-
shot of the situation in the fall of 2015, some general 
conclusions can be drawn. 
The degree of sustainable return at the three  
locations in South Sudan seems to depend on how 
well returnees can secure their livelihoods for them-
selves and their families and can reduce the risks of 
impoverishment put forward by Cernea (2000). How 
well they can secure their livelihoods depends par-
ticularly on the accessibility of resources at their  
return location. This includes mainly, but is not limited 
to, the access of food, land, jobs, markets and education. 
These different economic factors are interlinked:  
access to land or a job can influence the food security 
of a returnee. Overall, the access to these resources 
depends very much on the social network and political 
access a refugee has and the aid services received at 
the return location.
Conclusion
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have to become more flexible to develop community, 
rather than group-based long-term programmes that 
also take particular vulnerabilities of age and gender 
groups into account. Currently, the prospects of sus-
tainable return to and within South Sudan appear to 
be grim and if local governments and aid agencies do 
not improve actions regarding livelihood opportuni-
ties quickly, people will be forced to migrate again. 
The recent outbreak of violence has already forced 
thousands of people to flee. South Sudan is back in 
turmoil, and the challenges to return seem higher 
than ever. If demilitarization will one day finally 
come about, it will also need to extend beyond Juba 
to most of the country (Mamdani, 2016).
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